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AIRLINE MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS AND
BANKRUPTCIES: WILL THE COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENT SURVIVE?
JONNI WALLS

I.

INTRODUCTION

AIRLINE DEREGULATION has produced a record
number of mergers and bankruptcies in the airline industry, turning the industry into a "national oligopoly."'
Since deregulation, over 200 scheduled carriers have
gone out of business, mainly because of mergers, acquisitions and bankruptcies. 2 As a result, the top eight carriers control over 90 percent of the market. Since 1978
more than 120 airlines have filed various types of bankruptcy proceedings.' The flurry of merger activity that
began almost immediately upon enactment of deregulation 5 continues to be extremely vigorous. Between 1985
and 1987 over twenty-five mergers took place, and 1986
1 P. DEMPSEY, THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF DEREGULATION 81
(1989); Dempsey, Airline Deregulationand Laissez Faire Mythology: Economic Theory in
Turbulence, 56J. AIR L. & CoM. 305 (1990).
2 Sheets & Dworkin, A Dogfight for Dominance of the Skies, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Sept. 11, 1989, at 54.
Dempsey, Robber Barons in the Cockpit: The Airline Industry in Turbulent Skies, 18
TRANSP. L. J. 133, 137 (1990). The carriers are American Airlines, United Air
Lines, Texas Air, Delta Air Lines, Northwest Airlines, TWA, U.S. Air, and Pan Am.
Id.
, Carnevale, PresidentialAir to End Pact Feb. 6 as Feeder for Continental at Dulles,
Wall St. J., Jan. 11, 1988, at 8, col. 1. See also Papaioannou, The Duty to Bargainand
Rejection of Collective Agreements Under Section 1113 by a Bankrupt Airline: Trying to Reconcile R.L.A. with the Bankruptcy Code, 18 TRANSP. L.J. 219, 220 (1990).
Kahn, Airlines, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN EXPERIENCE, 348 n.58 (G. Sommers, ed. 1980).
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witnessed more mergers than any year in history.6
Deregulation produced cuts in fares as airlines competed for passengers. Fare cuts eroded the potential for
profit, requiring management to search for ways to cut
costs. 7 Mergers and bankruptcies are options that, among
other benefits, allow airline management to abrogate collective bargaining agreements which once provided wage
stability and job security to their labor force.8 Consequently, collective bargaining agreements became ineffective protection for employees of merged or bankrupt air
carriers.
In a merger, the unions representing employees of the
target carrier are decertified by operation of law because
they no longer represent a majority of the craft or class of
employees. 9 Decertification extinguishes rights under the
collective bargaining agreement.' 0 Before 1984, a carrier
who filed a petition in bankruptcy was able to reject its
collective bargaining agreements along with other executory contracts.1 ' The law required no bargaining with em6 Rept. of Comm. on Railway & Airline Labor Law, 3 LAB. LAw. 393, 402 (1987).
7 P. DEMPSEY, supra note 1, at 172 n. 12. "The squeeze on profits engendered by

the increased competition unleashed by deregulation has strongly motivated airline management to insist on higher levels of efficiency, enhanced productivity,
and lower labor costs. The confrontation between management and labor in this
industry since deregulation has been fierce." Id.
a Another practice introduced into the airline labor context with deregulation is
a technique known as "alter-ego" or "double-breasting" which has long been familiar in other industries. Jansonious & Broughton, Coping with Deregulation: Reduction of Labor Costs in the Airline Industy, 49J. AIR L. & CoM. 501, 504-05 (1984).
A parent or holding corporation forms or acquires a non-union subsidiary. The
parent then channels all expansion through the new carrier and cuts back on the
union carrier's operations, which effectively phases out the union carrier in favor
of a lower cost operation. Id. at 505. See also Kozicharow, Air Transport Carriers
Press to Cut Labor Costs, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Aug. 29, 1983, at 29, 31 (discussing Frontier Holdings' formation of Frontier Horizon to rid itself of unionized
Frontier Airlines). This practice has received judicial approval. See, e.g., Air Line
Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Texas Int'l Airlines, 502 F. Supp. 423, 424 (E.D.N.Y. 1980),
aff'd, 656 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1981).
9 Northwest Airlines, Inc., 13 N.M.B. 399, 400-01 (1986); Republic Airlines, 8
N.M.B. 49, 54-56 (1980).
10 Republic Airlines, 8 N.M.B. at 55.
11 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1988), which provides: "Except as provided [elsewhere in this title], the trustee, subject to the court's approval, may assume or
reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor." Id.
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ployees over the effects of this economic disruption.
This comment will address the current legal status of
airline collective bargaining agreements in mergers and
bankruptcies, two major threats to employment stability.
The first section briefly surveys those economic effects of
deregulation most relevant to the airline workforce. After
discussing job stability, wages, and working conditions,
this first section also outlines the types of labor protection
available to airline employees before and after
deregulation.
This comment next identifies three separate labor dispute categories and specific resolution procedures provided by the Railway Labor Act' 2 governing collective
bargaining between airline management and employees.
Post-merger labor disputes engender two distinct types of
issues, "minor" and "representation" disputes. The cases
discussed demonstrate that the courts' overlapping of the
two types of disputes has led to unfortunate consequences
for airline collective bargaining agreements.
Finally, the discussion focuses on Association of Flight Attendants v. Delta Air Lines, I" a case which preserves a
union's rights under the successorship clause in its collective bargaining agreement, even after a merger. The D.C.
Circuit held that the union is entitled to arbitrate over
damages for breach of its contract. This decision may significantly strengthen a union's position in merger negotiations between two carriers. It also reaffirms the federal
courts' commitment to the grievance arbitration process
for resolution of disputes arising in a collective bargaining
relationship.
The second major division of this comment addresses
the current legal status of collective bargaining agreements when an employer/carrier seeks debt relief through
a bankruptcy proceeding. A brief review of case law will
illustrate that, prior to 1984, the federal courts grappled
2 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1988).
- 879 F.2d 906 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1781 (1990).
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with the fundamental tension between established labor
policy and bankruptcy law. Inconsistent treatment of collective bargaining agreements by lower federal courts
eventually culminated in a Supreme Court decision' 4
which outraged organized labor. The final portion of this
comment is devoted to the legislative response to that decision, namely the Federal Judgeship and Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1984,15 and a discussion of cases addressing
legal issues which have arisen since its enactment.
II.

A.

MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS

Pre-DeregulationLabor Protection

Before the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978,16 airline
mergers were subject to approval by the Civil Aeronautics
Board (CAB).' 7 The CAB granted approval only if the
proposed transaction was consistent with the "public interest."' 18 The "public interest" included a concern for
the status of employees affected by the merger. 9 In keeping with this statutory objective, since the early 1950s the
CAB imposed protective measures for employees affected
14

NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984).

'15
Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 330 (codified at II U.S.C. § 1113 (1988)).

16 Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 49 U.S.C. app. (1988)) (amending Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. app.
§§ 1301-1542 (1988)).
17 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973, 977, repealed by Federal
Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731, 744 (codified as amended
at 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1301-1542 (1988)).
is 49 U.S.C. app. § 1378(b) (originally enacted as Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938,
ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973). This section provides, in part:
Unless, after a hearing, the Board finds that the transaction [consolidation merger, or acquisition of control] will not be consistent with
the public interest or that the conditions of this section will not be
fulfilled, it shall, by order, approve such transaction, upon such
terms and conditions as it shall find to be just and reasonable and
with such modifications as it may prescribe ....
Id.
19 United-Western Acquisition of Air Carrier Property, 11 C.A.B. 701, 708
(1950), aff'd sub nom. Western Air Lines v. CAB, 194 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1952).
"Very often, these benefits to the stockholders and the public will be at the expense of some of the employees of the companies involved. We think it only equitable that in such circumstances, the hardships borne by adversely-affccted
employees should be mitigated by provisions for their benefit." Id.
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by commercial transactions.2 ° These measures, known as
labor protective provisions (LPPs), reduced employee
hardship resulting from mergers.
Since 1950, the Board acknowledged the collective bargaining agreement as the most satisfactory means of providing stability and protection for workers 2 ' and adopted
a policy allowing an affected employee to elect either benefits afforded by the CAB order (LPPs) or severance benefits provided in a collective bargaining agreement.2 2 In no
event could employees receive less than the amount to
which they were entitled under their respective labor contracts. 2 3 This was a clear indication that the CAB anticipated that rights and obligations under collective
bargaining agreements would survive a merger. 4
In 1961 the United-CapitalMerger Case standardized LPPs
for airline mergers. 5 The standardized LPPs generally
provided compensatory allowances for displacement or
termination, integration of seniority lists, relocation
assistance and establishment of a mechanism for arbitrating LPP disputes.2 6 Before deregulation the CAB, in effect, assumed the traditional role of a labor union,
protecting the job stability, wages, working conditions,
20 Id. at 713. The Civil Aeronautics Board made a finding that employees had
been adversely affected by the merger. Prior to this transaction, the Board had
not found displacement of any employees so had not had occasion to impose conditions for the protection of workers. Id.
2
North Atlantic Route Transfer Case, 12 C.A.B. 124, 129 (1950). "Voluntary
arrangements between the carriers and labor groups as to the protection to be
accorded to affected employees should take precedence over any action by the
Board in relation to the matter." Id.
22 North Atlantic Route Transfer Case, 12 C.A.B. 140, 141 (1950) (supplemental opinion).
23 Id.
24 See infra notes 82-160 and accompanying text concerning present treatment
of collective bargaining agreements in a merger situation.
2s5 33 C.A.B. 307, 323 (1961). These were modified only slightly thereafter by
the Allegheny-Mohawk Merger Case, 59 C.A.B. 19 (1972). Although LPPs are no
longer imposed by any government agency as a condition of merger, they are
commonly agreed to by an acquiring carrier in merger negotiations. See DeltaWestern Acquisition Case, DOT Order Nos. 86-10-44 & 86-12-30 (1986).
26 See S. ROSENFIELD, LABOR PROTECTIVE PROVISIONS IN AIRLINE MERGERS
(1981). This book presents an in-depth study of LPPs in airline mergers prior to

deregulation.
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and security of airline employees. Apart from the regulatory role of the CAB, the Railway Labor Act (RLA) 27 has
since 1936 governed the collective bargaining process
and dispute resolution between unionized airlines and
their employees. The RLA provides for grievance arbitration by a System Board of Adjustment 28 and for certification of bargaining representatives by the National
Mediation Board (NMB). 29
B.

Effect of Deregulationon Airline Labor

Organized labor vehemently opposed the passage of
the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978.30 This opposition
stemmed from the fear that the American airline industry
would become an oligopoly. Unions predicted unbridled
competition, price slashing, and unemployment as a result
of the proposed legislation, leaving only a few carriers in
control of major markets. 3 ' Over the AFL-CIO's strin27

45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188.

45 U.S.C. § 184 (1988). See infra notes 60-78 and accompanying text for a
discussion of dispute resolution procedures under the Railway Labor Act.
29 45 U.S.C. § 152, Ninth.
Kahn, supra note 5, at 337. Organized labor created an "Airline Labor Coordinating Committee of the AFL-CIO" composed of representatives of five unions
(International Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA); Brotherhood of Railway, Airline & Steamship Clerks (BRAC); Flight Engineers International Association
(FEIA); International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers (IAM); and
Transport Workers Union of America (TWU)) to bring labor's position to the
attention of Congress while the deregulation bill (S. 689) was under consideration. Id.
51Regulatory Reform in Air Transportation:Hearings on S. 292 and S. 689 Before the
Subcomm. on Aviation of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1322 (1977) (statement by the AFL-CIO Executive Council on
Airline Deregulation).
Proposals to radically change the Federal regulatory laws governing
air transportation, currently pending before the House and Senate
Aviation Sub-committees, would adversely affect the stability of the
air transport industry and the job security of over 300,000 airline
2a

3o

employees . . . . Specifically, the legislative proposals, if enacted,
would . . . encourage cut-throat pricing practices in some markets

and some higher prices and reduced service in smaller markets; increase the possibility of bankruptcy of several large carriers and impose financial hardship on several others ....
Id.
The net result of deregulation will be fewer jobs in air transport,
higher rates of unemployment among those now employed in the
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gent objection, the Act became law on October 24, 1978.
As demonstrated below, labor's foresight has proved to
be accurate. 2
Airlines entered the free market of deregulation with
Factors such as inflation, rising
heavy debt burdens.3
fuel prices, and the cost of replacing aging equipment significantly increased operating expenses.3 4 The aftermath
of the air traffic controllers' (PATCO) strike temporarily
limited flights to and from major airports.3 5 Perhaps most
significant, low-cost carriers entered the market in great
numbers, intensifying fare competition. 6
Prior to deregulation, carriers faced with rising costs
could secure corresponding industry-wide fare increases
through the CAB. 3 7 Since deregulation, however, compeindustry, and the total destruction of existing seniority systems
.... S. 689, as it now stands, would generate cutthroat competition
aimed at forcing one or more lines out of markets they now serve or
out of business altogether. Carriers, forced by such competition to
suspend or limit present operation would naturally leave hundreds
or even thousands of workers economically stranded.
Id. at 1323 (statement ofJohn F. Peterpaul, General Vice President, International
Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO).
The destruction of section 408 [of the Federal Aviation Act, providing for LPPs] will sweep away what little protection the [Civil AeroAs the
nautics] Board has allowed employees in this industry ....
carriers tighten their belts to cut their prices to meet competition,
what will they look to to accomplish the economics compelled upon
them? They cannot control the price of fuel; they cannot control the
cost of aircraft or aircraft parts; they cannot control their airport
costs . . .. They can cut corners on safety and they can cut their work
forces .... [Labor organizations] know who suffers when a carrier
feels compelled to cut its costs. It is the employee, regardless of the
mode of transportation. It is the employee.
Id. at 1287. (statement of William Mahoney, counsel for airline labor interests,
AFL-CIO).
32 See P. DEMPSEY, supra note 1, at 39-40. This book discusses the devastating
impact of deregulation on air carriers and their employees. During the first eighteen months of deregulation almost 22,000 airline employees lost theirjobs. Id. at
57 n.78. By 1983, the number had risen to more than 40,000. Id. at 40.
3, Grebey, Deregulation: Home Run or Strike Out for Labor Relations, 9 INDUS. REL.
L.J. 57, 62 (1987).
34 P. DEMPSEY, supra note 1, at 42-43.
15 Jansonious & Broughton, supra note 8, at 503 n.12.
-6 Airline Labor Policies Change in Deregulated U.S. Industries, Av. WEEK & SPACE
TECH., Nov. 12, 1984, at 190.
37

Id. at 191.
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tition from the myriad low cost carriers entering the marThus, any
reduction in overhead is usually exacted from the labor
force. 9 In a spirit of cooperation domestic airline unions
made drastic concessions by way of wage and pension reductions. 40 Despite concerns over compromised safety,
the unions even accepted the cost cutting measures of increased in-flight hours and the controversial two-person
cockpit. 4 '

ket makes fare increases relatively unfeasible. 3

C.

Post-DeregulationLabor Protection

1. LPPs
Without the protection formerly provided by government regulatory agencies, airline employees are left with
only such LPPs as may be negotiated between merging
carriers. The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 contains

3"

P. DEMPSEY, supra note 1, at 167. Before deregulation wages, staffing levels
and work rules were more generous than those available to new entrants after
deregulation. In the early years of deregulation newcomers could offer better
fares by virtue of low labor costs. Now incumbents have lowered labor costs to
remain competitive. Major carriers now utilize two-tier wage scales, with lower
rates for new hires, and have exacted wage and work rule concessions from present employees. Continental and TWA have successfully broken some of their unions. Id.
s9Airline Labor Policies Change in Deregulated U.S. Industries, supra note 36, at 191.
"The only significant cost that an airline can address is labor. We have no influence over the price of fuel or interest rates." Id.
40 Jansonious & Broughton, supra note 8, at 532-553. This article provides a
detailed discussion of concession bargaining in the airlines, as well as a summary
of collective bargaining agreements negotiated by major carriers American Airlines, Delta Air Lines, Eastern Airlines, Frontier Airlines, Northwest Airlines,
TWA, United, U.S. Air and Western Airlines in the years after deregulation. Concession bargaining has been the carriers' most common approach to cost cutting
since deregulation. Id. at 552.
41 Id. at 532-33. The two-person cockpit was the first major concession made
by airline unions after deregulation. Boeing 737's were certified for operation by
two pilots, but, in the interest of safety, ALPA had reached agreements with most
major carriers requiring operation by three pilots. The issue was submitted to
arbitration in the late 1960's, and the award upheld the three-pilot crew on the
gounds that 737's could not be operated safely by only two pilots. The issue was
resolved in favor of the employer in July 1981, following the ALPA strike at
United Airlines and after determination by a Presidential task force that new
model aircraft could be operated safely by only two pilots. Id. at 533 (citing 47
N.M.B. ANN. REP. 8 (1981)).
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provisions 42 which ostensibly cover certain "protected
employees ' 43 adversely affected by a "qualifying dislocation" resulting from deregulation.44 In reality, however,
this protection has been eroded by policies adopted by
government agencies. Unlike the LPPs which the CAB ordered merging carriers to pay, the Airline Deregulation
Act provides for payment by the Secretary of Labor.45
Mergers and bankruptcies occurring after October 24,
1988, are not covered by the provisions of the Act.46
The "public interest" concerns of the Federal Aviation
Act survived deregulation, in part, as "the need to encourage fair wages and equitable working conditions for
air carriers."4 7 In view of the narrow application of the
Act's labor protective provisions,4 8 this fair wage promise
appears to have been nothing more than window dressing
to make the Act more palatable to those opposing its passage. After deregulation, the CAB adopted the policy that
airline employees covered by union contracts should rely
on the collective bargaining process for protection in
merger situations. 49 Since collective bargaining agree49 U.S.C. app. § 1552.
Id. § 1552(h)(1). A "protected employee" is a person, excluding officers and
members of the board of directors, who has been employed by a duly certified air
carrier for at least four years on October 14, 1978. Id.
4
Id. § 1552(h)(2). A "qualifying dislocation" is a "bankruptcy or major contraction of an air carrier" which occurs within ten calendar years after October 24,
1978, "the major cause of which is the change in regulatory structure provided by
the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, as determined by the Civil Aeronautics
Board." Id.
45 Id. § 1552(a)(1).
46 Id. § 1552(h)(2).
42
4

47

Id. § 1302(3).

See infra notes 52-55 and accompanying text. This section discusses postderegulation policy in imposing LPPs.
- Texas International-National Acquisition, DOT Order No. 79-12-163 (1979)
at 67. See also Piedmont-Empire Acquisition Show Cause Proceeding, DOT Order
No. 86-1-45 (1986) (refusing to impose LPPs because "[t]he nature and level of
airline employee benefits. . . are appropriately determined" through collective
bargaining); Air Florida System-Western Acquisition Show Cause Proceeding, 93
C.A.B. 545, 567-68 (1982) (imposing LPPs only to the extent that the acquiring
carrier agrees to their imposition and refusing to extend the time limit on the
LPPs' coverage); Texas Int'l-Continental Acquisition Case, 92 C.A.B. 70 (1981)
(imposing LPPs but refusing to honor request that collective bargaining agreements be honored).
48
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ments do not survive a merger, the result of this policy is
that the employee has neither the protection of government-imposed LPPs nor of a collective bargaining
agreement.5 0
On January 1, 1985, the CAB's authority to approve
mergers and acquisitions 5' became the province of the
Department of Transportation (DOT).52 The DOT soon
announced its policy to impose LPPs "only where necessary to prevent labor strife that would disrupt the nation's
air transportation system." '5 3 It preferred that "carriers
and unions should decide through private negotiations
what benefits should be paid airline employees in the
event of a merger or acquisition.

'5 4

The DOT's policy

was unsound because collective bargaining agreements
and the rights they secure are extinguished when a
merger takes place. Thereafter, the acquiring carrier has
no duty to negotiate with a union which is no longer the
certified bargaining representative of its employees. The
55
policy has nevertheless been upheld by federal courts
and applied in numerous mergers and acquisitions.5 6
-1oSee infra notes 82-85 and accompanying text for a discussion of the treatment
of collective bargaining agreements in a merger situation.
-1149 U.S.C. app. § 1378 (1988).
-12 Civil Aeronautics
Board Sunset Act of 1984, § 3, 49 U.S.C. app. § 1551
(1988).
- Midway-Air Florida Acquisition Show Cause Proceeding, DOT Order No. 856-33 (1985). This criteria is unlikely ever to be satisfied. "With deregulation,
other carriers can move quickly to fill gaps in service, so a strike will not disrupt
the transportation system." Id. See also, Southwest Airlines-Muse Air Acquisition,
DOT Order No. 85-6-79 (1985).
54 Midway-Air Florida, DOT Order No. 85-6-33, at 5.
55 Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Department of Transp., 791 F.2d 172 (D.C. Cir.
1986); Independent Union of Flight Attendants v. Department of Transp., 803
F.2d 1029 (9th Cir. 1986).
-,6 Horizon-Cascade Acquisition Show Cause Proceeding, DOT Orders Nos. 861-43, 86-1-67 (1986); Texas Air-Eastern Acquisition Case, DOT Order No. 86-721 (1986); NWA-Republic Acquisition Case, DOT Order No. 86-7-81 (1986);
Joint Application of People's Express, Inc. & United Air Lines, Inc., DOT Order
No. 86-8-3 (1986); Application of Alaska Air Group, Inc., AAG Holdings Inc. &
Jet American Airlines & Application of Delta Air Lines, Inc., DOT Order No. 869-18 (1986); TWA-Ozark Acquisition Case, DOT Order No. 86-9-29 (1986); Joint
Application of Texas Air Corp. & People's Express, Inc., DOT Orders Nos. 86-1026, 86-10-53 (1986); Delta-Western Acquisition Case, DOT Order No. 86-12-30
(1986).
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The DOT's authority expired January 1, 1989, and responsibility for approval of mergers next fell to the Department of Justice (DOJ).
In keeping with the DOT's
policy that the public interest is best served by relying
upon market forces without unnecessary government regulation,58 the DOJ's primary focus now is on antitrust implications of airline mergers. The present attitude toward
airline mergers is one of extreme permissiveness.59 The
following sections demonstrate that employment security
afforded by collective bargaining agreements may also be
illusory since the agreements themselves usually do not
survive a merger.
2.

Collective BargainingAgreements

a. Dispute Resolution Under the Railway Labor Act
The Railway Labor Act (RLA)60 governs collective bargaining between airline management and employees. Its
primary emphasis is informal, cooperative methods of settling disputes. 6 The RLA, however, provides more formal structures for resolving certain types of disputes
when informal agreement fails. The merger of a union
carrier into a nonunion entity raises the type of disputes
addressed by the RLA and brings into effect the specific
dispute resolution mechanisms provided.
-7 49 U.S.C. app. § 1551(a)(7).
.,8 Texas International-National, DOT Order No. 85-6-79, at 29. "[Tjhe very
purpose of the Deregulation Act was to eliminate government oversight and review of the wisdom of business decisions by air carrier managements." Id.
s' P. DEMPSEY, supra note 1, at 147. "In later decisions on merger applications,
the agencies seemed to manipulate antitrust analysis to justify approval of almost

any merger. More lenient antitrust standards are being applied administratively
without statutory amendment. The applicants are becoming bolder in proposing
increasingly anticompetitive mergers and are meeting only 'cotton candy' opposition." Id.
- 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1988).
61 45 U.S.C. § 152, Second provides: "All disputes between a carrier or carriers
and its or their employees shall be considered, and, if possible, decided, with all
expedition, in conference between the representatives designated and authorized
so to confer, respectively, by the carrier or carriers and by the employees thereof
interested in the dispute." Id.
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The RLA recognizes two categories of labor disputes6 2
relevant in the merger context: (1) "Minor disputes" (or
grievances) arising out of the application or interpretation
of an existing collective bargaining agreement; 63 and (2)
''representation disputes" which call for a determination
of the employees' representative in contract negotiations
and administration, as well as definition of the bargaining
unit, craft or class of employees represented. 64 The following sections outline the RLA's specific resolution procedure for each type of dispute.
b.

"Minor" Disputes: Arbitration

"Minor disputes" are resolved through arbitration.6 5
The RLA imposes a duty on carriers and labor organiza62 A third category is "major" disputes, involving establishment of collective
bargaining agreements. 45 U.S.C. § 156. This section requires a carrier to bargain over "rates of pay, rules and working conditions." Id. This type of dispute
would, of course, not arise in a merger situation where a collective bargaining
agreement is already in existence between the parties.
[Major disputes relate] to disputes over the formation of collective
[bargaining] agreements or efforts to secure them. They arise where
there is no such agreement or where it is sought to change the terms
of one, and therefore the issue is not whether an existing agreement
controls the controversy. They look to the acquisition of rights for
the future, not to assertion of rights claimed to have vested in the
past.
Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 723 (1945).
"Major" disputes must be resolved through the notice and mediation procedures set out in Section 6 of the RLA, including invocation of the National Mediation Board. 45 U.S.C. §§ 156, 183. If mediation does not avail and either party
refuses binding arbitration, a thirty-day cooling off period ensues. Id.. §§ 155,
156, 183. During this process the parties must maintain the status quo regarding
rates of pay, rules, and working conditions, even though the prior contract may
have expired. Id.; see also International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Texas Int'l Airlines,
717 F.2d 157, 159 (5th Cir. 1983). Each has recourse to the courts for enforcement of the status quo. Id. The NMB may not "enforce the requirement that parties to a dispute maintain the status quo pending the results of the Act's disputeresolution mechanism." Id. Only after exhausting statutory dispute resolution
procedures may the parties resort to self-help; that is, the union may strike, and
the employer may unilaterally change terms and conditions of employment. 45
U.S.C. 99 156, 183; Elgin, 325 U.S. at 725; Teamsters v. Texas Int'l, 717 F.2d at 159.
63 45 U.S.C. § 157. The "major" and "minor" nomenclature does not appear
in the RLA, but comes from the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Elgin,
325 U.S. at 722-28, and has been commonly adopted in the industry.
- 45 U.S.C. § 152, Ninth.
-, 45 U.S.C. § 184.
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tions to contractually provide a "system board of adjustment" for arbitration of disputes over interpretation of

existing collective bargaining agreements .66 Jurisdiction
over a "minor" dispute lies exclusively with the adjustment board. 67 Neither federal nor state courts have jurisdiction to interpret collective bargaining agreements
subject to the RLA.68 Courts may, however, make the determination of whether a dispute is in fact "minor,"69 order the parties to submit to binding arbitration, 7 and
enforce awards reached through the arbitration process.71
Thus, when a merger violates the terms of an existing collective bargaining agreement, it raises a "minor" dispute
amenable to arbitration. v
Id.; see also International Ass'n of Machinists v. Central Airlines, 372 U.S.
682, 686 (1963); Ozark Air Lines v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l, 577 F. Supp. 487,
490 (E.D. Mo. 1983), aff'd, 744 F.2d 1347 (8th Cir. 1984).
67 Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Trans World Airlines, 655 F.2d
155, 158 (8th Cir. 1981).
- Slocum v. Delaware L. & W. R.R., 339 U.S. 239, 244 (1950); International
Ass'n of Machinists v. Aloha Airlines, Inc., 776 F.2d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 1985);
International Ass'n of Machinists v. Republic Airlines, 761 F.2d 1386, 1389-90
(9th Cir. 1985); Teamsters v. Texas Int'lAirlines, 717 F.2d at 159; Transport Workers
Union v. American Airlines, 413 F.2d 746, 748 (10th Cir. 1969).
69 United Transp. Union v. Burlington N. R.R., 458 F.2d 354, 357 (8th Cir.
1972). If there is a reasonable argument that the dispute involves contract interpretation, the courts will defer to the appropriate system board of adjustment. Id.
The burden of showing that a matter does involve contract interpretation is "relatively light." Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Northwest Airlines, 444 F. Supp. 838, 841
(D. Minn. 1977), aff'd, 570 F.2d 257 (8th Cir. 1978); See Flight Attendants v. TWA,
655 F.2d at 158-59.
70 Association of Flight Attendants v. Delta Air Lines, 879 F.2d 906, 917 (D.C.
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1781 (1990); InternationalAss 'n of Machinists v.
Aloha Airlines, 776 F.2d at 815; InternationalAss'n of Machinists v. Republic Airlines,
761 F.2d at 1390; International Ass'n of Machinists v. Northeast Airlines, 473
F.2d 549, 556 (1st Cir. 1972) [hereinafter IAM v. Northeast I].
71 IAM v. Central Airlines, 372 U.S. at 685; Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Eastern
Airlines, 632 F.2d 1321, 1324 (5th Cir. 1980). The scope of review is extremely
narrow. As long as the arbitrator's award is arguably drawn from the agreement,
it is valid and "effectively etched in stone." Id.
72 Elgin, 325 U.S. at 723.
[Minor disputes contemplate] the existence of a collective [bargaining] agreement already concluded or, at any rate, a situation in
which no effort is made to bring about a formal change in terms or
to create a new one. The dispute relates either to the meaning or
proper application of a particular provision with reference to a spe-
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c.

"Representation" Disputes: National Mediation Board
Disputes as to identity and certification of a collective
bargaining representative comprise a distinct category of
"representation" disputes 73 within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Mediation Board (NMB).74 Strictly
speaking, the carrier is not a party to this type of dispute
and does not participate in its resolution. 75 "Representation" disputes encompass questions of whether a majority
of the affected craft or class favors representation by the
union, 76 as wl
well as whether two related carriers will be
treated as one for representation purposes.77 Obviously,
disputes as to the post-merger status of a union also fall
within this category.78
A simple showing of majority interest will suffice for
NMB certification of a union as the bargaining representative of a given class or craft. 79 The merger of a union car-

Id.

cific situation. ... [T]he claim is to rights accrued, not merely to
have new ones created for the future.

73 Teamsters v. Texas Int'l, 717 F.2d at 158-59. Representation disputes involve
determining the collective bargaining representative of the employees and the
proper bargaining unit, craft, or class of employees to be represented. Id. at 158.
74 45 U.S.C. § 152, Ninth. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the NMB's
power to resolve "any dispute.... among a carrier's employees as to who are the
representatives of such employees" is exclusive. Switchmen's Union v. NMB, 320
U.S. 297, 303 (1943); see also, Flight Attendants v. Delta, 879 F.2d at 912; Air Line
Employees Ass'n v. Republic Airlines, 798 F.2d 967, 968-69 (7th Cir. 1986); Teamsters v. Texas Int'l, 717 F.2d at 158; Airline Pilots Ass'n v. Texas Int'l Airlines, 656
F.2d 16, 23-24 (2d Cir. 1981); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Northeast Airlines, 536 F.2d 975, 977 (1st Cir. 1976) [hereinafter JAM v. Northeast II]; Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. United Air Lines, 325 F.2d 576, 579-80 (6th Cir.
1963).
75 Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Association for Benefit of Non-Contract
Employees, 380 U.S. 650 (1965). The carrier's only function is to provide documentation to the NMB. Id.
76 ALPA v. Texas Int'l, 656 F.2d at 23; Summit Airlines v. Teamsters Local Union
No. 295, 628 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1980); Provincetown-Boston Airline, 6 N.M.B. 29
(1976).
77 Republic Airlines, Inc., 8 N.M.B. 49 (1980).
78 Teamsters v. Texas Int'l, 717 F.2d at 159. "A representation dispute may occur
even if only one union claims to represent the employees if there is a question
whether a majority of the craft or class desires the union's representation." Id.
79 45 U.S.C. § 152, Fourth, provides in part: "The majority of any craft or class
of employees shall have the right to determine who shall be the representative of
the craft or class for the purposes of this chapter." Id.

1991]

COMMENTS

861

rier with a non-union entity, however, creates doubt as to
whether the union still represents a majority of any craft
or class of employees. Where such doubt exists, federal
courts leave resolution of the dispute to the NMB. ° The
NMB cannot certify a minority union as representative of
the employees)'
When airlines merge to form a single transportation
system, NMB policy dictates that any union representing
employees of the target carrier is decertified by operation
of law effective as of the merger date. 2 The NMB does
not have adjudicatory power to determine the extent of a
carrier's duty to bargain. 5 Nor does it have authority to
interpret or enforce terms of collective bargaining contracts between carriers and unions.8 4 Interpretation is left
to arbitrators and enforcement, ultimately, to federal
courts .85

3. Judicial Treatment of Post-Merger Disputes
Relatively few federal appellate courts have addressed
the post-merger status of airline collective bargaining
agreements. Those courts addressing the issue unanimously hold that survival of an airline union's certification
is a question within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
NMB. 8 6 The decisions discussed below illustrate the appellate courts' treatment of post-merger issues raised by
airline unions. The common thread in these cases is the
JAM v. Northeast II, 536 F.2d at 977.
45 U.S.C. § 152, Fourth.
82 Air Line Exec. Ass'n v. Republic Airlines, 798 F.2d 967, 968-69 n.4 (7th Cir.
1986); Teamsters v. Texas Int'l, 717 F.2d at 163; Northwest Airlines, Inc., 13 N.M.B.
399, 400-01 (1986); Republic Airlines, Inc., 8 N.M.B. 49, 54-56 (1980).
83 1AM v. Northeast 11, 536 F.2d at 977. "Where there is no real question about
whether a union is the legitimate representative of an airline's employees, the
function of deciding the extent of duty to bargain rests properly with federal
courts." Id.
84 Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 402 U.S. 570, 579-80 (1977).
- LAM v. Central Air Lines, 372 U.S. at 684-85.
86 Air Line Employees Ass'n v. Republic Airlines, 798 F.2d at 968-79; Teamsters v.
Texas Int'l, 717 F.2d at 159; ALPA v. Texas Int'l Airlines, 656 F.2d at 23-24; IAMv.
Northeast H, 536 F.2d at 977; 1AM v. Northeast 1, 473 F.2d at 555-56; Brotherhood of
Ry & S.S. Clerks v. United Air Lines, 325 F.2d at 579-80 (6th Cir. 1963).
80
81
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union's decertification as bargaining representative following a merger. The distinguishing feature is the character of relief sought.
The earliest appellate court decision to address postmerger decertification in the airline context was Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks v. United Air Lines.87
This dispute arose out of the merger of Capital Airlines
into United Airlines in 1961.88 Although the merger
agreement between the two carriers provided that United
would be responsible for all "debts, liabilities and duties"
of the acquired carrier, 89 United refused to be bound by
any of Capital's existing labor agreements. 90 The union
unsuccessfully urged the CAB to impose the collective
bargaining agreement on United as a condition of the
merger 9 ' and then filed suit for declaratory judgment that
United was bound by the terms of the agreement.9 2 The
union's pleadings alleged an action in contract, 93 but the
relief sought was "maintenance of a collective bargaining
agreement. '94 The Sixth Circuit, therefore, characterized
the action as a "representation dispute" over which it had
no jurisdiction.95
In another pre-deregulation merger dispute, InternationalAssociation of Machinists v. Northeast Airlines,96 the First
Circuit characterized a merger as a management decision
close to the "core of entrepreneurial control" over which
the carrier/employer did not have a statutory duty to bar97

s

325 F.2d 576 (6th Cir. 1963).
Id. at 576.

89 Id. at 577.
9

/d.

Id.
Id. at 577, 579.
t,.1Id. at 579.
1'4 Id.
imId. at 578. "Three decisions of the Supreme Court make it clear that the
federal courts have no jurisdiction over the solution of representation disputes."
Id. (citing Switchmen's Union of North America v. National Mediation Board, 320
U.S. 297 (1943); General Committee v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. Co., 320 U.S.
323 (1943)); General Committee v. Southern Pacific Co. 320 U.S. 338 (1943)).
ski473 F.2d 549 (lst Cir. 1972) (merger of Northeast and Delta).
9.
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gain. 97 The union sought enforcement of a collective bargaining agreement clause providing for bargaining over
employees' seniority and other rights prior to a merger or
consolidation.98 The court refused to enjoin the merger
under a balance of hardships analysis. 99 It did affirm,
however, that interpretation of the terms of a collective
bargaining agreement raised a minor dispute subject to
arbitration. 100

The court did not order Northeast to bargain with the
union partly because of its confidence that the CAB's approval of the merger would be conditioned upon "the acceptance by the parties of labor protective provisions
designed to protect the employees of the merged airlines
from any adverse impact the merger may have on conditions of employment, and also to establish machinery for
the peaceful settlement of any labor-management disputes arising out of the merger."'' The implication was
that if CAB approval of merger conditions were not required, it might be appropriate for the union's position to
be given some weight in the merger. 0 2 As history since
deregulation will attest, however, the courts' position has
shifted toward complete deference to the NMB's exclusive
jurisdiction.
97 Id. at 556 (citing Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203
(1964).
Id. at 551.
Id. at 553. The court acknowledged that the union faced serious consequences if the employer merged into a nonunion entity whose employees vastly
outnumbered union members. On the other hand, the injunction could result in
collapse of the merger which would have serious ramifications for the carrier. The
court, therefore, weighed the possible injury to the union against irreparable
harm to the carrier caused by the injunction and chose the course likely to cause
the least injury. Id.
- Id. at 554-55.
lo,Id. at 559 (citing American Airlines v. CAB, 445 F.2d 891 (2d Cir. 1971);
Kent v. CAB, 204 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1953).
102 Id. The court implied that the situation might be different in "an unregulated industry, [because] if highly restrictive labor protective provisions in a collective bargaining agreement make unfeasible certain planned postmerger
operating changes, the acquiring corporation may still be willing to proceed with
the acquisition, foregoing the originally planned changes." Id.
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In a subsequent action between the same parties, 0 3 the
union challenged the successor's (Delta's) failure to bargain over integration of seniority lists and the survival of
other rights arising from the defunct collective bargaining
agreement. 104 Significantly, the union did not seek a
court order to arbitrate,'0 5 but instead sought a finding that
the successor carrier had a duty to bargain or negotiate.
Because the union was no longer certified as the majority
representative of Delta's employees, however, the court
0 6
had no jurisdiction to grant the relief sought.1
A "double-breasting" situation gave rise to the dispute
in Air Line Pilots Association v. Texas InternationalAirlines.10 7
The parent corporation of Texas International formed a
holding company, Texas Air Corporation, of which both
Texas International and a new nonunion entity, New York
Air, became wholly owned subsidiaries. 0 8 New routes
were then awarded to New York Air,' 0 9 and the Air Line
Pilots Association (ALPA) filed suit, contending that the
creation of New York Air was part of a scheme to "defeat
the existing collective bargaining relationship" between
the union and the pilots of Texas International Airlines
(TXI)." The relief sought was "an order requiring TXI
to deal exclusively with ALPA. ' ""' The union chose not
to invoke the dispute resolution procedures of the RLA,
but instead "sought judicial intervention to prevent what
-. IAM v. Northeast H, 536 F.2d at 975.
Id. at 976.
'os Id. at 978. "Plaintiffs do not allege that they have instituted grievance proceedings which are outstanding or that Delta has refused to submit to a System
Board of Adjustment resolution of particular disputes concerning the survival of
rights under the Northeast collective bargaining agreements." Id.
-6 Id. at 977. "[T]he duty to bargain imposed by the Railway Labor act is a
duty to bargain with the chosen representative of the majority of a craft or class of
employees. . . . In the absence of National Mediation Board certification, 45
U.S.C. § 152 Ninth, there is no basis for finding a duty on the part of Delta to
negotiate with plaintiffs." Id.
,-v 656 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1981). See supra note 8 for a discussion of "doublebreasting" in the airline industry.
Id. at 17.
Id.
Id.
.. Id. at 18.
104
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it perceived as an illegal attempt by TXI to circumvent its
collective bargaining obligations."' "1 2 Once again, because there was doubt as to whether ALPA represented
New York Air employees, the court deferred' to the NMB's
jurisdiction over "representation disputes." "13
Through subsequent acquisitions, Texas Air Corporation eventually orchestrated the merger of Continental
and Texas International into one airline, Continental,
thereby giving rise to the dispute in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Texas InternationalAirlines." 4 Continental employees in the affected crafts were not unionized." '5
After filing an application with the NMB seeking certification as representative of employees in the merged entity,
the union filed suit seeking a declaration that its collective
bargaining agreement was valid ' 6 and an injunction
maintaining the status quo pending determination of the
representation question.' ' 7 In this decision, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged for the first time the potential overlapping of "representation disputes" within the NMB's
exclusive jurisdiction and those "other disputes" reserved
for judicial resolution." 8 The "other disputes" would, of
course, be "minor" disputes for which the court could order arbitration or enforce an award. Instead of coming to
grips with this inconsistency, however, the court held that
the underlying dispute was "a question of employee rep20
resentation"" 9 and, therefore, deferred to the NMB.'
Id. at 20.
1 ld. at 24.
112

11

717 F.2d 157 (5th Cir. 1983).

"1 Id. at 160.
116 Id.
11
Id.
11" Id. at 161.
Continuation of the contract in force unavoidably constitutes a determination of employee representation, and the conjunction of the
two issues creates a conflict in principles, one dictated by the express
statutory provision giving the Board sole jurisdiction over representation matters and the other implicit from the limited scope of the
statute, that other disputes are reserved for judicial resolution.
Id.
1" Id. at 164.
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The dispute in Air Line Employees Association v. Republic
Airlines' 2 ' arose from the proposed merger of Republic
Airlines with Northwest Airlines. Northwest entered into
transition agreements with two unions representing its
ground employees, whereby those unions would repre22
sent the combined workforce of the post-merger entity.
The association, representing Republic's employees, filed
suit seeking an injunction to preserve the status quo until
the NMB could conduct an election to determine the majority representative. 2 The association also sought an
order to compel arbitration of its grievance over Repub24
lic's violation of the collective bargaining agreement.
Predictably, the Seventh Circuit considered the dispute
representational, notwithstanding, the contract claims
and again deferred to the NMB.' 25 Thus, appellate
courts' treatment of post-merger claims as "representation disputes" became firmly entrenched, even though
other causes of action were frequently swept away with
the extinguished collective bargaining agreements.
4.

Association of Flight Attendants v. Delta:
of the Successorship Clause

Survival

A recent decision by the D.C. Circuit, Association of Flight
Attendants v. Delta Air Lines,' 26 is significant for its holding
that a successorship clause in a collective bargaining
agreement may survive a merger and entitle the union to
damages. 2 7 The court held that even the NMB's exclu120 Id. "After a merger that makes the employee group hitherto represented by
the Union a minority of the craft, the question of employee representation inevitably arises. When this happens, resolution of the question is the function of the
National Mediation Board." Id.
12, 798 F.2d 967 (7th Cir. 1986).
122 Id.
123 Id. at 968.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 968-69.
126 879 F.2d 906 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 1781 (1990).
127 Id. at 909.
Even though a claim for injunctive or declaratory relief has been

rendered moot by intervening events .... a claim for damages keeps

the controversy alive if that claim "isnot so insubstantial or so
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sive jurisdiction over representation disputes does not
divest federal courts of jurisdiction to order binding arbitration of a union's claim that an airline breached its successorship clause when it merged with a non-union
carrier.' 28 The case arose from the 1987 merger of Western Airlines and Delta, a non-union carrier.' 29 The Association of Flight Attendants (AFA) represented Western
30

employees.1

In return for prior bargaining concessions by AFA,
Western had agreed to a successorship clause whereby
any successor or parent company was to be bound by the
terms of the contract.'13 Nevertheless, Western's merger
agreement with Delta did not purport to bind Delta 3to2
Western's existing collective bargaining agreements.1
AFA filed a grievance, asserting that Western's breach of
its contractual duty under the successorship clause
amounted to a "minor dispute" which should be submitted to arbitration.13 3 Western refused to arbitrate, and
the union filed its complaint in United States District
clearly foreclosed by prior decisions that th[e] case may not proceed." Thus, the question whether the consummation of the merger
and the decertification of AFA rendered this case moot turns upon
whether AFA appears to state a claim upon which it could recover in
arbitration an award of damages against Western for breach of the
successorship provision in the CBA.
Id. (citations omitted).
128

Id. at 917.

1- Id. at 907 (Only the pilots and dispatchers are unionized at Delta).
130 Id.
1,' Association of Flight Attendants v. Western Airlines, 662 F. Supp. 1, 2
(D.D.C. 1987), rev'd sub nom. Association of Flight Attendents v. Delta Air Lines,
879 F.2d 906 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1781 (1990). AFA's collective bargaining agreement with Western provided, in part: "This agreement shall
be binding on any successor or merged Company or Companies, or any successor
in the control of the Company, its parent(s) or subsidiary(ies) until changed in
accordance with the provisions of the Railway Labor Act, as amended." Id.

"3 879 F.2d at 907.
"- 662 F. Supp. at 1. Section 24(D) of the contract, established under 45
U.S.C. § 184 (Section 204 of the Railway Labor Act), provided for arbitration by
the System Board of Adjustment over disputes " 'growing out of grievances or out
of interpretation or application of any of the terms of the' collective bargaining
agreement but 'shall not extend to change in hours of employment, rates of compensation or working conditions ... '" Id.
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Court in January 1987.13 4 AFA alleged that if the System
Board ruled in its favor, available relief could include an
order binding Delta to the terms of its agreement with
Western, or in the alternative, "a determination that
Western would be required to respond in damages in the
event that it failed to bind Delta to the CBA."' 3 Despite
exhaustive efforts by AFA and other Western unions, the
3 6
district court dismissed AFA's 3 7complaint, m
and the
scheduled.1
as
merger took place
The NMB subsequently ruled that the merger had eliminated Western as a separate operating entity. The certifications of its unions, including AFA, were extinguished
retroactively to the merger date (April 1, 1987) because
they now represented a minority of their crafts in the
merged enterprise. 38 Delta subsequently moved to dismiss AFA's appeal of the district court's decision on
grounds that the NMB's decertification of AFA rendered
the cause moot. The United States Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit disagreed.' 39 Although AFA's claim for
injunctive relief was rendered moot by consummation of
the merger and resulting decertification by the NMB, the
court held that "a claim for damages keeps the controversy alive if that claim 'is not so insubstantial or so clearly
foreclosed by prior decisions that th[e] case may not proceed.' ",140 Because the arbitrator could award damages,
4
the request for an order to arbitrate was not moot.' '
The Flight Attendants court astutely recognized that
while the merger situation appears to raise "representa,.4 662 F. Supp. at 2.

879 F.2d at 908.
662 F. Supp. at 4.
1-17

879 F.2d at 908.

Is In re Delta Air Lines, Inc. and Western Air Lines, Inc., 14 N.M.B. 291, 301
(1987).
,so 879 F.2d at 910. The court of appeals stated: "[A]s long as some issues
remain alive, 'the remaining live issues supply the constitutional requirement of
case or controversy.' " Id. at 909 (citing Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 49697 (1969).
1 Id. (citing Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1978)).
,4, Id. (citing Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448,
459 (1957); Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 442-43 (1984)).
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tion issues", 42 far more was at stake than the decertification of a bargaining representative. The United States
Supreme Court has held that arbitration is an available
means of resolving disputes which arise under the RLA
but do not fall within the realm of the NMB.' 41 Therefore, the union's claim for breach of contract cannot be
declared nonarbitrable simply because there is a tangential "representation issue."' 4 4 An arbitrator's award of
damages to the union, even when subsequently enforced
through judicial proceedings, would not disturb the
NMB's decertification function. "This dispute is over a
sum of money: Delta has it and AFA wants it; no other
person, and no transaction,
is affected by which of them
' 45
winds up with it.'

The FlightAttendants decision has favorable implications
for unions which face abrogation of an existing collective
bargaining agreement due to merger or acquisition of the
employer/carrier. Although the collective bargaining relationship may not survive the merger, a successorship
clause like that in the contract between Western and
AFA' 46 gives rise to a viable cause of action for contract
damages. This decision offers a union some hope of recovery which survives the finality of decertification.
The salient distinction between earlier merger decisions and Flight Attendants is the relief sought by the
Id. at 917.
General Comm. of Adjustment v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. Co., 320 U.S.
323, 336-37 (1943).
142

143

144
145

879 F.2d at 917.
Id. at 914.

An award of damages for a past breach of contract, on the other
hand, would not [invade the NMB's exclusive jurisdiction over representation issues]. First, the NMB's policy of revoking a minority
union's certificate as of the date of an operational merger would not
be affected ifit were later determined that the carrier, by agreeing to
the terms of the merger, had breached its [collective bargaining
agreement.... Second, an award of damages would have no effect
on the NMB's certification determination. .

.

. Finally, a damage

award, unlike prospective relief, would not cause any confusion as to
which union is the proper post-merger representative.
Id. at 913-14.
14r See supra note 131 setting forth the contents of the successorship clause.
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union. ' 4 7 The earlier cases did not present an independ-

ent claim for damages, 48 but only for decertification or
"representation" issues. Whether framed in terms of an
employer's refusal to bargain, 49 or a declaratory judgment enforcing the contract,' 5 ° any affirmative relief
would still in effect have amounted to a certification of the
union as bargaining representative.' 5 ' Federal courts
have declined subject matter jurisdiction to decide this
52
type of claim.'
Such is not the case in Flight Attendants. The union did
not dispute that the NMB's decertification order precluded its right to represent Delta employees after the
merger date. 5 3 The union simply asserted, and the court
agreed, that Delta 54 should be ordered to arbitrate over
Western's breach of its successorship clause,'- 5 and that a
147 See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Western Airlines, 813 F.2d 1359 (9th
Cir.), inj. stayed pending cert., 480 U.S. 1301 (O'Connor, J., in chambers), vacated
mer., 484 U.S. 806 (1987) dismissed as moot, 854 F.2d 1178 (9th Cir. 1988). This
case was ultimately dismissed as moot because the disputed merger had already
taken place. Neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit on remand expressed any opinion as to the viability of claims asserted in the post-merger context. See infra notes 168-177 and accompanying text, discussing this case in more
detail. See also Air Line Exec. Ass 'n v. Republic, 798 F.2d at 968-79; Teamsters v. Texas
Int'l, 717 F.2d at 159; ALPA v. Texas Int'l, 656 F.2d at 23-24; JAM v. Northeast 11,
536 F.2d at 977; Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. United, 325 F.2d at 579-80.
148 In ALPA v. Texas Int'l, 656 F.2d at 18, the Second Circuit noted the union's
claim for contract damages but deferred to the NMB'sjurisdiction. However, the
union in that case sought a judicial award of damages, rather than an order to
arbitrate. Judicial intervention would have circumvented the specific "minor dispute" resolution provisions of the RLA at 45 U.S.C. § 184.
14q See Air Line Exec. Ass'n v. Republic, 798 F.2d at 968; ALPA v. Texas Int'l, 656
F.2d at 17-18; JAM v. Northeast 11, 536 F.2d at 975.
15o Teamsters v. Texas Int'l, 717 F.2d at 160; Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. United, 325
F.2d at 576.
15' Teamsters v. Texas Int'l, 717 F.2d at 162. "The form of the complaint [does]
not control for the substance of the dispute in fact involved the question of representation of the employees." Id.
152 See supra notes 73-81 and accompanying text, discussing resolution of "representation" disputes.
-" FlightAttendants v. Delta, 879 F.2d at 909; In re Delta Air Lines, Inc. & Western Air Lines, Inc., 14 N.M.B. 291, 301 (1987).
154 As the acquiring corporation in the merger, Delta assumed the liabilities of
Western. L. SOLOMON, D. SCHWARTZ &J. BAUMAN, CORPORATIONS LAW AND POLicy 947 (1988).
155 Flight Attendants v. Delta, 879 F.2d at 910.
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federal district court has jurisdiction to order the arbitration. 56 The relief sought by the AFA does not aspire to

any relationship between the union and the employer beyond the date of merger. Rather, it looks to legal rights
and duties created by the collective bargaining agreement
before the merger was conceived.
The issue still to be addressed is whether Delta is now
"answerable in damages" for Western's failure to honor
its contractual commitment. 57 This claim survives abrogation of the collective bargaining agreement by the
merger. 18 The court stated, "[W]e decline to hold ...
that a bargained-for successorship clause creates no legal
rights or duties whatsoever. Whether the successorship
clause in this case creates any legal obligations is, of
course, a matter within the province of the arbitrator."' 5 9
Accordingly, the matter was remanded to the district
court for an order to arbitrate.' 60
The Supreme Court denied certiorari 161 after inviting
the Solicitor General to file a brief stating the position of
[A]n arbitrator might find that Western was required to structure the
merger so as to preserve itself as a separate operating entity....
[T]he arbitrator might also find that the NMB's determination to extinguish AFA's certification as representative of the former Western
flight attendants was a foreseeable consequence of Western's
breach, and that the carrier is liable to AFA for its contract damages.
The situation would be no different analytically if the [collective bargaining agreement] had expressly provided for a sum of liquidated
damages in the event that Western breached the successorship
clause.
Id.
15 Id. at 917.
This damage action is not a jurisdictional dispute within the NMB's
exclusive jurisdiction under § 2, Ninth, of the RLA. At most, it may
raise what Delta calls a "representation issue." . .. We therefore
conclude that § 2, Ninth of the RLA does not divest the district court
of jurisdiction to order arbitration of AFA's claim for damages.
Id.
Id7
ld. at 917.
-1 Id. at 910. "[A]s a general rule, grievances arising before expiration of a
CBA survive and continue to be governed by its terms." Id., (citing Elgin, 325
U.S. at 711).
-9Id. at 917.
160Id.

lco 110 S. Ct. 1781 (1990).
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the United States. 62 Thus, there remains at least hope
that AFA, having lost its right to represent Western's former employees, will recover its contractual expectations
from the defunct collective bargaining agreement. The
Solicitor General, in his brief, took the position that "allowing the arbitration to go forward is fully compatible
with the statutory plan to entrust representation disputes
exclusively to the NMB and to entrust minor disputes
' 63
over contract application exclusively to arbitrators."'
Nor did the Solicitor General see a conflict between Flight
Attendants and other appellate court decisions in view of
the unique nature of relief sought: "a claim for damages
164
for a pre-merger breach of a successorship provision."'
The Brief did, however, distinguish a recent decision of
the Second Circuit, Flight Engineers InternationalAssociation
v. Pan American World Airways, 165 which appears slightly in
tension with the Flight Attendants holding.' 66 Finally, the
Solicitor General disagreed with Delta's contention that
the court of appeals' decision would "create a climate of
uncertainty inhibiting airline mergers."167
-62 110 S. Ct. 402 (1989).

-63
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 3, Delta Air Lines, Inc. v.
Association of Flight Attendants, AFL-CIO, 110 S. Ct. 1781 (1990) (No. 89-459)
[hereinafter Brief of the United States].
64 Id.
,B 896 F.2d 672 (2d Cir. 1990).
6
Brief of the United States, supra note 163, at 6-7. The cases are significantly
different on their facts. Flight Attendants stemmed from a single pre-merger action
by the employer, entering the merger agreement with Delta in breach of its successorship clause. Flight Engineers v. Pan Am, on the other hand, addressed a
union's claim that an airline had breached a "scope" clause requiring the carrier
or its subsidiaries to use union employees for all of a designated type of work.
Although the union's claim was amended to seek only damages, it still implicated
concerns within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NMB because there had been no
conclusive determination of the representation issue following Pan Am's acquisition of Ransome Airlines. Flight Engineers, 896 F.2d at 674.
, Brief of the United States, supra note 163, at 3.
Although the risk of damages for breach of a successorship provision
conceivably could influence the structure or viability of some airline
mergers, more likely it would simply affect the price at which a transaction remains attractive. ...
At all events, even if some airline mergers are affected by the decision below, the policies of the Railway Labor Act do not provide a
basis for changing that result. If Congress determines that the en-
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The result in Flight Attendants is surprising because the
Supreme Court did not deal favorably with the action
brought by two other unions whose contracts were also
extinguished by the Western/Delta merger. 68 Justice
O'Connor lifted an injunction ordered by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 169 This allowed the merger to be
completed on schedule. Subsequently, the Court granted
certiorariand then vacated and remanded the lower court's
decision. 70 The Ninth Circuit eventually dismissed the
matter as moot, the merger having been completed and
17
the labor contracts extinguished.
Neither Justice O'Connor's opinion staying the injunction, 72 nor the Ninth Circuit's dismissal of the appeal as
moot, 73 mentioned damage claims, although they were
raised by the pleadings.' 74 The Ninth Circuit characterized the relief sought as "an order compelling Western 17to5
arbitrate and an injunction prohibiting the merger."
Justice O'Connor's opinion focused only upon the propriety of the Ninth Circuit's injunction of the merger and the
emergency relief sought. 1 76 Since neither opinion foreclosed the union's damage claim in Flight Attendants, the
D.C. Circuit remanded the case for an order to
forcement of successorship clauses adversely affects air or rail systems, it can provide a legisltive [sic] remedy. Existing RLA
provisions should not be stretched beyond their proper bounds to
deny the claim asserted here.
Id. at 8-9.
- International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Western Airlines, 813 F.2d 1359 (9th
Cir.), inj. stayed pending cert., 480 U.S. 1301 (O'Connor, J., in chambers), vacated
mem., 484 U.S. 806 (1987), dismissed as moot, 854 F.2d 1178 (9th Cir. 1988).
'

480 U.S. at 1304.

484 U.S. at 806.
17, 854 F.2d at 1178. Once Justice O'Connor lifted the Ninth Circuit's injunction, legal obstacles to the merger were removed. The final step of the DeltaWestern merger took place, and Western ceased to exist as a separate operating
entity. The matter became moot because the relief sought in the union's original
complaint was no longer available. Id.
172 480 U.S. at 1304.
17,854 F.2d at 1178.
14 Flight Attendents v. Delta, 879 F.2d at 914.
175 Teamsters v. Western, 854 F.2d at 1178.
176 480 U.S. at 1308-10.
170
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77

5. Analysis
The result in Flight Attendants is sound. If the NMB's
decertification of a union automatically adjudicated the
remaining damage claim as well, the NMB would, in effect, have exclusive jurisdiction over a cause of action for
which it cannot grant relief. Thus, the successorship
clause in an airline labor contract would confer only a
right without a remedy. 78 The Supreme Court has previously made clear that the "representation dispute" powers granted to the NMB under Section 2, Ninth, of the
RLA 179 are extremely narrow. 80 It would be anomalous
now to construe those powers to include interpretation or
application of an existing collective bargaining

agreement. 181
Furthermore, delegating resolution of a "minor dispute" to the NMB would undermine the contractual arbitration machinery which lies "at the very heart of the
Flight Attendants v. Delta, 879 F.2d at 917.
178Air Line Pilots Ass'n & Northwest Airlines, ALPA Case No. CHI-60-73-F
(Eaton, 1975), reprinted in M. HILL & A. SINICROPI, REMEDIES IN ARBITRATION 23
(1981).
It is often the case in industrial disputes ... that the fashioning of a
remedy appropriate to a right is required. The necessity for this is
founded in the common law maxim that where there is a right, there
is a remedy. That maxim, in turn, is derived from the simple realization that where a right is purportedly granted, but where no remedy
is awarded when the right is violated, the right itself is meaningless.
ld.
11

,79 45 U.S.C. § 152, Ninth.
,8o Switchmen's Union v. NMB, 320 U.S. at 305. "Under this Act Congress did
not give the Board discretion to take or withhold action, to grant or deny relief. It
gave it no enforcement functions. It was to find the fact and then cease." Id.
,8, Flight Attendants v. Delta, 879 F.2d at 916.
In the absence of some specific indication that the legislature intended that all issues arguably related to representation must be decided by the NMB, we cannot conclude that Congress vested in a
body with such limited powers exclusive jurisdiction over a potentially broad range of disputes that may only tangentially raise issues
within its competence.
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system of industrial self-government."'' s2 Thirty years
ago in the Steelworkers' Trilogy' 8 3 the Supreme Court firmly
established arbitration as the most desirable method of
resolving disputes under a collective bargaining agreement." 4 The "arbitration of labor disputes" was described by the Court as "part and parcel of the collective
bargaining process itself."'81 5 The Supreme Court recognized a strong presumption of arbitrability in holding that
"[a]n order to arbitrate the particular grievance should
not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an
interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts
should be resolved in favor of coverage."'' 8 6 The Flight
Attendants holding that a union's damage claim for breach
of the successorship clause is arbitrable implicitly imports
this time-honored principle of industrial common law into
the merger context.
182 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581
(1960).
Arbitration is the means of solving the unforeseeable by molding a
system of private law for all the problems which may arise and to
provide for their solution in a way which will generally accord with
the variant needs and desires of the parties. The processing of disputes through the grievance machinery is actually a vehicle by which
meaning and content is given to the collective bargaining agreement.
Apart from matters that the parties specifically exclude, all of the
questions on which the parties disagree must therefore come within
the scope of the grievance and arbitration provisions of the collective bargaining agreement.
Id.
183United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); Steelworkers
v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 574; United Steelworkers v. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
184 See
M. HILL & A. SINICROPI, supra note 178, at 13-22. This source presents
an in-depth discussion of the Steelworkers' Trilogy, its impact on labor-management
relations, and the judicial response.
185 Warrior & Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. at 578.
'
Id. at 582-83.
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BANKRUPTCY

Treatment of Collective BargainingAgreements Under Prior
Provisions of the Bankruptcy Code

Section 365 of the United States Bankruptcy Code allows a trustee in bankruptcy, with court approval, to reject
any existing executory contract of the debtor. 87 At one
time, collective bargaining agreements were treated as
any other executory contract and were subject to rejection
by an employer upon filing a petition for reorganization
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. 88 This treatment created a fundamental tension between bankruptcy
law and national labor policy. 8 9
Theoretically, contracts governed by the Railway Labor
Act (RLA)1 90 were always exempted from automatic rejection by Section 1167 of the Bankruptcy Code.' 9 ' Elimina187 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1988). "Except as provided [elsewhere in this Title], the
trustee, subject to the court's approval, may assume or reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor." Id.
18 11 U.S.C. § 502(a), (g).
'89The U.S. Supreme Court held in the Steelworkers' Trilogy that collective bargaining agreements were not just ordinary commercial contracts. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
The collective bargaining agreement states the rights and duties of
the parties. It is more than a contract; it is a generalized code to
govern a myriad of cases which the draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate. The collective bargaining agreement covers the whole employment relationship. It calls into being a new common law-the
common law of a particular industry or of a particular plant ........
A collective bargaining agreement is an effort to erect a system of
industrial self-government. When most parties enter into contractual relationships they do so voluntarily, in the sense that there is no
real compulsion to deal with one another, as opposed to dealing
with other parties. This is not true of the labor agreement. The
choice . . . is between having that relationship governed by an
agreed-upon rule of law or leaving each and every matter subject to
a temporary resolution dependent solely upon the relative strength,
at any given moment, of the contending forces.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. at 578-80 (citations omitted).
1- 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1988).
19,11 U.S.C. § 1167 provides:
Notwithstanding section 365 of this title, neither the court nor the
trustee may change the wages or working conditions of employees of

1991]

COMMENTS

877

tion of an existing collective bargaining agreement would
have the effect of changing the wages and working conditions of employees subject to the agreement. Section
1167 provides that neither the bankruptcy court nor a
trustee may implement such changes without first exhausting the bargaining procedures set out in the Railway
92
Labor Act.1
Conflicting views existed as to whether Section 1167
applied to airline contracts. The confusion resulted in
part from an earlier version of the statute clearly protecting only railroad employees, 9 3 and in part from inconsistent judicial interpretation. t94 The usual result was that
airline collective bargaining agreements were unilaterally
abrogated in a bankruptcy proceeding, and the employees, having already granted major concessions to the enthe debtor established by a collective bargaining agreement that is
subject to the Railway Labor Act (45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.) except in
accordance with section 6 of such Act (45 U.S.C. § 156).
Id.
192 45

U.S.C. § 156.
-gs11 U.S.C. § 205(n), repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, 2642 (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (1988)). "No
judge or trustee acting under this Act shall change the wages or working conditions of railroad employees except in the manner prescribed in the Railway Labor
Act, as amended June 21, 1934, or as it may be hereafter amended." Id. The
present Bankruptcy Code provides that "wages or working conditions of employees of the debtor established by a collective bargaining agreement that is subject to
the Railway Labor Act" shall not be changed except in accordance with Section 6 of
the Railway Labor Act. 11 U.S.C. § 1167 (1988) (emphasis added).
-i Air Florida Pilots Ass'n v. Air Florida, Inc. (In re Air Florida Sys. Inc.), 48
Bankr. 440 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985). "A collective bargaining agreement between
a union and an air carrier that, absent bankruptcy, is generally subject to the Railway Labor Act is not operatively distinguishable from a collective bargaining
agreement that is subject to the National Labor Relations Act." Id. at 444. See also
Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. REA Express, 523 F.2d 164 (2d Cir. 1975), explaining that Congress intended only railroad workers to be exempt from the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act because they were "entitled to the unique benefits of
railroad reorganization under § 77 of the Bankruptcy Act .. " Id. at 169 n.4
(citing H.R. REP. No. 1897, 72nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1933); S. REP. No. 92-1158,
92nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1972)).
But cf., In re Overseas Nat'l Airways, 238 F. Supp. 359 (E.D.N.Y. 1965). "[T]he
debtor's employees are covered by the Railway Labor Act which, by the terms of
the Bankruptcy Act itself (Section 77 sub. n, section 205, sub. n, of Title 11, U.S.
Code), prescribes the only method by which collective bargaining agreements of
the kind here involved may be disaffirmed." Id. at 360-61 (emphasis in original).
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terprise, became pre-petition creditors in the eyes of the
bankruptcy court. 95 Thus, all claims for damages and
other entitlements arising under the rejected collective
bargaining agreement had to be filed with the bankruptcy
court and assigned priority by the court.' 6 All employee
claims or grievances were treated
as unliquidated claims
97
1
reorganization.
of
purposes
for
Despite the usual abrogation of collective bargaining
agreements in a Chapter 11 proceeding, a dichotomy of
opinion developed regarding the appropriate standards
to use in determining when the agreement could be rejected. Some courts simply applied a business judgment
rule test despite the unique nature of a labor contract.' 98
Others followed an approach first advanced in In re Over,93 Oversight Hearing on Effect of Bankruptcy Actions on the Stability of Labor-Management Relations and the Preservation of Labor Standards: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Labor-Management Relations and Subcomm. on Labor Standards of the House Comm. on
Education and Labor, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 19-20 (1983) [hereinafterJoint Hearing]
(statement of Susan Bianchi Sand, Vice President, Association of Flight Attendants, AFL-CIO).
As a result of either legislative ambivalence or inattentiveness to detail, the status of the airline collective-bargaining agreement after
the filing of the bankruptcy petition is unclear. Despite the traditional specialized concern that the Railway Labor Act pacts be differentiated from other labor pacts ....
[alirline labor contracts seem to
be confined to the same limbo status as other labor contracts in the
bankruptcy setting.
Id. at 20-21.
1- 11 U.S.C. § 502(g).
197 11 U.S.C. § 502(e). These claims included loss of wages, fringe benefits,
severance, vacation, sick leave, and pension contributions. See also Bendixsen, Enforcing the Duty to Arbitrate Claims Arising Under a Collective Bargaining Agreement Rejected in Bankruptcy: Preserving the Parties' Bargain and the National Labor Policy, 8
INDUS. REL. LJ. 401, 421 (1986) (discussing treatment of employee claims in a
bankruptcy proceeding).
198See, e.g., In re Continental Airlines Corp., 38 Bankr. 67, 71-72 (Bankr. S.D.
Tex. 1984) (rejecting "the notion that the [bankruptcy] was 'engineered' over a
period of time by management as the means by which it could reject these [collective bargaining] contracts"); In re Rath Packing Co., 36 Bankr. 979, 989-98
(Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1984); In re Concrete Pipe Mach. Co., 28 Bankr. 837, 839-40
(Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1983) ("collective bargaining agreements should receive no
more protection than other executory contracts which may be rejected"); Ateco
Equip., Inc. v. Columbia Gas (In re Ateco Equip., Inc.), 18 Bankr. 915, 916-917
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1982).
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seas National Airways, Inc. 199 This latter approach paid lip
service to the collective bargaining commitment by requiring "thorough scrutiny, and a careful balancing of the
equities on both sides. 20 0
The Overseas National Airways court acknowledged that
relieving a debtor from all contractual duties under a collective bargaining agreement could deprive its employees
of "their seniority, welfare and pension rights, as well as
other valuable benefits which are incapable of forming
the basis of a provable claim for money damages."2 0°
Consequently, employees could be left with virtually
nothing while their employer made favorable arrangements with its creditors at the employees' expense. 2
Some courts specifically held, however, that an arbitration
clause survived rejection, leaving a duty to arbitrate the
issue of damages sustained as a result of the rejection. 0 3
The first federal appellate court to articulate a standard
for rejection of collective bargaining agreements was the
Second Circuit in Shopmen's Local Union No. 455 v. Kevin
Steel Products.20 4 The standard it adopted was Overseas National Airways' lenient "balancing of the equities. 20 5
Within a year, however, the court adopted a more rigid
standard in Brotherhood of Railway Clerks v. REA Express,
Inc. 206 The REA standard allowed rejection only where an
"onerous and burdensome" collective bargaining agreement alone would thwart efforts to save a failing carrier in
bankruptcy from collapse. 0 7
1- 238 F. Supp. 359 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).
200 Id. at 361.
201 Id. at 361-62.
202 Id. at 362.
23 Truck Drivers Local Union No. 806 v. Bohack Corp., 541 F.2d 312 (2d Cir.
1976).
2519 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1975).
205 Id. at 704.
20523 F.2d 164 (2d Cir. 1975). "[I]n view of the serious effects which rejection
has on the carrier's employees it should be authorized only where it clearly appears to be the lesser of two evils and that, unless the agreement is rjected, the carrier
will collapse and the employees will no longer have their jobs." (Emphasis added.)
Id. at 172.
207 Id. at 167.
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Courts following the REA approach applied a two-step
determination: (1) whether the collective bargaining
agreement was so burdensome that successful reorganization would be impossible without rejection; and (2)
whether the equities of the particular fact situation favored the debtor/employer.2 0 8 Notwithstanding the lofty
objectives of this careful scrutiny, in practice in the equities usually weighed in favor of the burdened employer.
The United States Supreme Court, in NLRB v. Bildisco &
Bildisco,2 0 9 resolved the inconsistency among the circuits
between the strict REA test and the perfunctory Kevin Steel
equity balancing.
B.

The Bildisco Decision

Bildisco involved an employer who filed a voluntary petition for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code and was eventually granted authority to
reject its collective bargaining agreement pursuant to Section 365(a). 210 Prior to approval by the bankruptcy court,
however, Bildisco unilaterally ceased paying wage, pension and health obligations. 21 This cessation violated the
agreement's express provision that the contract terms
were binding on the parties and their successors should
bankruptcy intervene. 2 Unfair labor practice charges
filed by the union representing approximately forty-five
percent of the work force resulted in a National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) order that Bildisco pay pension,
health and welfare benefits, and union dues as provided in
the contract. l3 The Court of Appeals for the Third Cir214
cuit, however, refused to enforce the NLRB's decision.
208 In re Alan Wood Steel Co., 449 F. Supp. 165, 169 (E.D. Pa. 1978); In re
Penn Fruit Co., 92 L.R.R.M. 3548 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
2-

465 U.S. 513 (1984).

Id. at 522-23.
Id. at 518.
212 Id. at 518.
213 Id. at 517-19.
214 NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 682 F.2d 72, 84-85 (3d Cir. 1982), aff'd, 465
U.S. 513 (1984).
210
211
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The Supreme Court, affirming the Third Circuit, held
that a collective bargaining agreement should be rejected
under Section 365(a) as long as the debtor shows that the
agreement burdens the estate and that the equities balance in favor of rejection.2 '5 The Court acknowledged
that Congress had intended a higher standard'than the
business judgment rule for rejection of a collective bargaining agreement, but held that the standard was something less than the REA standard.21
In essence, the
standard adopted was the "balancing of equities" stan2 7
dard espoused in Kevin Steel.
The Court further concluded that, while a debtor-inpossession remains the same entity which existed before
the filing of the bankruptcy petition, the Bankruptcy Code
empowers the debtor "to deal with its contracts and property in a manner it could not have employed absent the
bankruptcy filing. '21 The result was that "from the filing
of a petition in bankruptcy until formal acceptance, the
collective-bargaining agreement is not an enforceable
contract," even prior to court authorized rejection. 9
Thus, in Bildisco the Supreme Court granted judicial
sanction to a practice which had in effect already become
a new economic weapon, "the growing use of the Federal
bankruptcy laws by corporations to abrogate labor agreements and commitments to workers. ' ' 22 0 Although the
Bildisco decision avers that labor agreements subject to the
Railway Labor Act are expressly exempted by Section
1167 of the Bankruptcy Code, the case has been cited to
justify rejection of airline contracts as well. 22
Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 525-26.
Id. at 526.
217 Id. at 520-2 1; see also In re Brada Miller Freight Sys., Inc., 702 F.2d 390 (11 th
Cir. 1983).
21i
Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 528.
2,9 Id. at 530. Justice Rehnquist cogently stated, "[T]he filing of the petition in
bankruptcy means that the collective-bargaining agreement is no longer immediately enforceable, and may never be enforceable again." Id.
220 Joint Hearing, supra note 195, at 2 (statement of George Miller, Chairman,
Committee on Labor Standards).
2'
In re Air Florida Sys., Inc., 48 Bankr. at 443-44.
2

5

216
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Bildisco established that a bankruptcy court could nullify
a collective bargaining agreement merely upon a showing
that the employer could operate more cheaply without it.
The Bildisco test would also excuse an employer from performance of its collective bargaining agreement immediately upon filing a petition in bankruptcy, even before
adjudication of the motion to reject. The implications of
Bildisco for organized labor were devastating. Employees'
rights under a collective bargaining agreement were secure only so long as the employer deemed it economically
feasible to fulfill its obligations.
C.

The Response to Bildisco: Bankruptcy Amendments and
FederalJudgeship Act of 1984 222

Legislative reaction to the Court's pronouncement in
Bildisco was swift and forceful.223 The following day an
amendment to a pending bankruptcy reform bill was proposed.224 The amendment would have codified the
stricter standard for rejection applied in REA Express, 25
disallowing rejection of a collective bargaining agreement
unless the debtor could prove that otherwise reorganization would absolutely fail. 226 After a deadlock over enactment of legislation to ease the tension between labor
policy and bankruptcy law, an emergency bankruptcy
court restructuring bill passed, leaving wording of the labor protective provisions to a joint conference committee.
227
Ultimately Section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code
222 Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 330, 333 (1984) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1113
(1988)).
223 See Pulliam, The Collision of Labor and Bankruptcy Law: Bildisco and the Legislative
Response, 36 LAB. L. J. 390 (1985). This article presents a discussion of labor's

reaction to the Bildisco decision.

H.R. 4908, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. 2989 (1984).
523 F.2d at 167. See supra notes 205-208 and accompanying text for a discussion of the REA Express standards.
Sec226 H.R. 5174, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. 6221, 6224 (1984).
tion 277 of the bill was the basis for 11 U.S.C. § 1113. See Rosenberg, Bankruptcy
and the Collective Bargaining Agreement-A Brief Lesson in the Use of the Constitutional
System of Checks and Balances, 58 AM. BANKR. L.R. 293, 312-23 (1984). This article
contains a detailed legislative history of Section 1113.
227 11 U.S.C § 1113.
224

225
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emerged, effective on the date of its enactment, July 10,
1984. In the words of one court, Section 1113 "created
an expedited form of collective bargaining with a number
of safeguards designed to insure that the employers cannot use Chapter 11 solely to rid themselves of their union,
that are directly
but only [may propose] modifications
22 8
necessary for the firm's survival.
While Congress' main concern was to reverse the effect
of Bildisco, the legislative history of Section 1113 also
makes reference to the "flagrant abuse" of the Continental Airlines bankruptcy, 29 perhaps the most glaring perversion of the bankruptcy law in recent history. The
Railway Labor Act (RLA) expressly provides that changes
in the pay rates, rules and working conditions agreed
upon between air carriers and their employees will be implemented only in the manner prescribed in the agreements themselves or pursuant to procedures set out in the
RLA.2 30 Nevertheless, on September 24, 1983, Continen23 i
tal filed a voluntary Chapter 11 petition in bankruptcy
and then "announced the termination of two-thirds of its
unionized employees, unilaterally abrogated its union
contracts and implemented wage and benefit cuts of 50
percent, eradicated seniority, and established work rules
never before so much as reported to its union."' 2 32 Three
28

In re K&B Mounting, 50 Bankr. 460, 462-63 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1985).

2

130 CONG. REC. 6247 (1984).

We are all familiar with Continental Airlines' recent flagrant abuse
of the bankruptcy and labor laws by rejecting its contract, negotiated
under the Railway Labor Act ....

Since the Continental collective

bargaining agreement is subject to the Railway Labor Act, Continental's rejection of the agreement is clearly illegal under the current
law.
Id. (statement of Rep. Florio).
2 0 45 U.S.C. § 152, Second.
211 In re Continental Airlines Corp., 38 Bankr. 67, 69 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1984);
see also,Joint Hearing,supra note 195, at 6 (statement of Henry Duffy, President, Air
Line Pilots Association).
"2 Joint Hearing,supra note 195, at 6. "The action of Continental Airlines threatens air safety, destroys the concept of a truly integrated national air system, shatters the standard of living of its former employees, and demonstrates callous
disregard for that cornerstone of the free-enterprise system - the sanctity of a
" Id. at 4. "The Chairman of the Board [Frank Lorenzo] advertised
contract ....
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days later the "proud bird" arose from the ruins of its
burdened enterprise and resumed operations on its own
take-it-or-leave-it terms.233
The tactics employed by Continental are not available
to airline employers under Section 1113. The section emphatically applies to airline collective bargaining agreements, excluding only railroad contracts under Title I of
the RLA.23 4 The message of the new Section 1113 is
clear: an employer may no longer unilaterally terminate
or alter the terms and conditions of an existing collective
bargaining agreement without first complying with the
terms of the statute.23 5
D. Legal Issues Raised by Section 1113 of the Bankruptcy
Code
Section 1113 in essence affirms the "balancing of equities" standard unanimously adopted by the Court in
Bildisco,23 6 but rejects the notion that a debtor-in-possession may unilaterally breach a collective bargaining agreehis purpose in filing - to be rid of its union contracts and reduce the labor costs.
This is a use of Chapter 11 as a collective bargaining weapon ...." Id. at 7. It is
these tactics which earned Mr. Lorenzo his reputation as "the No. 1 union buster
in this country .. " Id. at 41 (statement of William L. Scheri, Airline Coordinator, International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO).
2"'Joint
Hearing,supra note 195, at 6; see also Kahn, supra note 5 at 339-40. Continental was not the first airline employer to employ this tactic to rid itself of labor
obligations. In 1933 Century Air Lines announced it would carry air mail at one
half the going rate. It then announced a cut in pilots' pay of $200 per month.
Pilots were ordered to resign and reapply for employment at the new rate. This
led to ALPA's first strike and eventually resulted in a bill submitted April 1, 1933,
to include air transport under the Railway Labor Act. Id.
234 11 U.S.C. § 1113(a).
The debtor in possession, or the trustee if one has been appointed
under the provisions of this chapter, other than a trustee in a case
covered by subchapter IV of this chapter and by title I of the Railway
Labor Act, may assume or reject a collective bargaining agreement
only in accordance with the provisions of this section.
Id.
d32 11 U.S.C. § 1113(f). "No provision of this title shall be construed to permit a
trustee to unilaterally terminate or alter any provisions of a collective bargaining
agreement prior to compliance with the provisions of this section." Id.
236 11 U.S.C. § 11 13(c)(3). "The court shall approve an application for rejection of a collective bargaining agreement only if the court finds that ... the balance of the equities clearly favors rejection of such agreement." Id.
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ment before formal bankruptcy court action. 37 The
statute imposes an affirmative duty on the employer to
bargain with the union prior to modification or rejection
of its contract.23 In effect Section 1113 "takes collective
bargaining out of the courts and returns them to the ne2 39
gotiating table where these issues should be handled.
In the six years since enactment of Section 1113, however,
certain issues have emerged which require judicial interpretation. This section, discusses some recent cases in
which those issues were addressed.
In the first decision to disallow rejection of a contract
under the new Code section, In re American Provision Co. ,240
the bankruptcy court identified nine requirements to be
met by an employer seeking to reject a labor contract. 4 '
237

11 U.S.C. § 1113(f).

2-

11 U.S.C. § 1113(b) provides, in pertinent part:

Id.

(1) Subsequent to filing a petition and prior to filing an application
seeking rejection of a collective bargaining agreement, the debtor in
possession or trustee (hereinafter in this section 'trustee' shall include a debtor in possession) shall (A) make a proposal to the authorized representative of the employees covered by such agreement, based on the most complete and
reliable information available at the time of such proposal, which
provides for those necessary modifications in the employees benefits and protection that are necessary to permit the reorganization of
the debtor and assures that all creditors, the debtor and all of the
affected parties are treated fairly and equitably; and
(B) provide, subject to subsection (d)(3), the representative of the
employees with such relevant information as is necessary to evaluate
the proposal.
(2) During the period beginning on the date of the making of a proposal provided for in paragraph (1) and ending on the date of the
hearing provided for in subsection (d)(l), the trustee shall meet, at
reasonable times, with the authorized representative to confer in
good faith in attempting to reach mutually satisfactory modifications
of such agreement.

239 Ruben, Developments in IndustrialRelations, 107 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 45 (1984)
(quoting AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland).
240 44 Bankr. 907 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984).
241 Id. at 909.
The nine tests are:
1) The debtor in possession must make a proposal to the Union to
modify the collective bargaining agreement.
2) The proposal must be based on the most complete and reliable
information available at the time of the proposal.
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The court further imposed upon the employer/debtor the
"burden of persuasion by the preponderance of the evidence on all nine elements. 2 42 Ultimately the court denied a motion to reject the collective bargaining
agreement because the employer had failed to confer in
good faith with the union.2 43 The following cases illustrate how bankruptcy courts have construed the American
Provision requirements.
In keeping with the American Provision requirements, the
employer must first make a proposal to the employees'
2 44
authorized representative to modify the agreement.
The union is the sole representative of all employees in a
specified class, craft, or bargaining unit. 245 It may not always be appropriate, however, for the union to represent
both active and retired workers in bargaining for modifications incident to a bankruptcy proceeding. 246 When a
bankruptcy court determines a conflict of interest be-

Id.

3) The proposed modifications must be necessary to permit the reorganization of the debtor.
4) The proposed modifications must assure that all creditors, the
debtor and all of the affected parties are treated fairly and equitably.
5) The debtor must provide to the Union such relevant information
as is necessary to evaluate the proposal.
6) Between the time of the making of the proposal and the time of
the hearing on approval of the rejection of the existing collective
bargaining agreement, the debtor must meet at reasonable times
with the Union.
7) At the meetings the debtor must confer in good faith in attempting to reach mutually satisfactory modifications of the collective bargaining agreement.
8) The union must have refused to accept the proposal without
good cause.
9) The balance of the equities must clearly favor rejection of the
collective bargaining agreement.

Id.
Id. at 911.
244 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(l)(A).
24s 45 U.S.C. § 152, Third, Fourth.
Under the RLA, a bargaining representative
has not only the right but also the duty to represent its members' claims under a
collective bargaining agreement. Wein Air Alaska, Inc. v. Bachner, 865 F.2d
1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1989).
246 In re Century Brass Products, Inc., 795 F.2d 265, 275 (2d Cir. 1986) (citing
Allied Chemical Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 172-73
(1971)).
242
243
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tween active and retired workers,247 the bankruptcy judge
should appoint a representative for the class of retirees.248
Rejection may be disallowed when the employer fails to
meet its threshold burden of negotiating with a representative of its retired employees.2 49
An employer's counter-proposal to the union's initial
opening has satisfied the proposal requirement,250
although an employer's claim that it bargained to impasse
before commencing the bankruptcy proceeding will
not.25 ' Consequently, the extensive concession bargaining which usually precedes an airline bankruptcy probably
will not satisfy the threshold requirement of a proposal.
The court has disallowed rejection where the employer's
proposal fails to meet all statutory requirements2 52 or
where it contains some illegal or discriminatory provisions.253 The proposal must deal only with changes that
will effect savings for the employer,254 and not with such
matters as overtime, shutdowns, job classifications, promotions, transfers, absenteeism, or tardiness.255
American Provision also requires that the employer base
its proposal on the "most complete and reliable information available at the time of the proposal. ' 256 The court in
2

Id. at 274:
In a Chapter 11 context a refusal to negotiate a reduction in retiree
benefits under § 1113 will "vitally affect" active employees in two
possible ways: first, it could mean that .... they will have to bear a

ld.

much larger reduction in wages and benefits in order to permit reorganization because of the significant cost of the retiree benefits; second, and more importantly, if retiree benefits cannot be
renegotiated, the debtor's reorganization may well fail, in which case
the active employees would most likely lose their jobs and benefits.

I248
d. at 275.
id. at 276.
2o In re Allied Delivery Sys. Co., 49 Bankr. 700, 703-04 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
(1985).
25 In re K & B Mounting, Inc., 50 Bankr. at 464.
252 In re American Provision Co., 44 Bankr. at 908-09.
253 In re Mile Hi Metal Sys., Inc., 67 Bankr. 114, 118 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985).
2
In re Valley Kitchens, Inc., 52 Bankr. 493 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985).
25 Id. at 495.
2- In re American Provision Co., 44 Bankr. at 909.
249
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In re K & B Mounting, Inc.2 5 7 interpreted this requirement
to call for detailed projections and recommendations to
aid the union in assessing the proposed contract modifications. 258 Another court, however, held in In re Salt Creek
Freightways259 that the employer must provide only such
information as is relevant for the union to evaluate the
employer's proposal. Section 1113 does not require the
employer to provide information for the union to evaluate
its own proposal or counterproposal. 2 6 Nor is an employer required to furnish audited financial data. 61
The third American Provision requirement, that "the proposed modifications must be necessary," has become the
focus of serious disagreement since the enactment of Section 1113. Federal court decisions are polarized between
a strict construction of "necessary" espoused in WheelingPittsburgh Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers2 62 and a deferential construction adopted in Truck Drivers Local No. 807 v.
Carey Transportation, Inc. 2 63 The Wheeling-Pittsburgh standard allows for only essential or bare minimum modifications in a collective bargaining agreement, while the Carey
Transportation test allows rejection whenever it would "in'2
crease the likelihood of successful reorganization. 1
The language of Section 11 13(b)(1)(A) mandates a proposal from the employer "which provides for those necessary modifications in the employees' benefits and
protections that are necessary to permit the reorganization
27

50 Bankr. 460 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1985).

Id. at 467.
47 Bankr. 835 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1985).
-o Id. at 839.
26i
In re Amherst Sparkle Mkt., 75 Bankr. 847, 850 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987). In
the case of a "financially distressed corporation which provides the Union with
supportive documentation for its current and projected financial posture," the
court held that provision of unaudited financial reports by the debtor was not
"fatal." Id.
262 791 F.2d 1074 (3d Cir. 1986).
"The 'necessary' standard cannot be satisfied
by a mere showing that it would be desirable for the trustee to reject a prevailing
labor contract so that the debtor can lower its costs." Id. at 1088; see also In re SolSieff Produce Co., 82 Bankr. 787 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1988).
251

259

263 816 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1987).
2-

id. at 89.
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of the debtor.... ,,65 This double use of the "necessary"
requirement is not mere surplusage. The House-Senate
Conference Committee which proposed the language ultimately enacted in Section 1113 intended this requirement
to be taken seriously.266 This intent is further evidenced
by the requirement for interim modifications under Section 1113(e) .267 The court in In re Wright Air Lines, Inc. 268
returned to the former REA Express standard, requiring
the debtor to show that the interim relief sought is "essential to the continuation of the debtor's business"
or
269
will avoid "irreparable damage to the estate.
The fourth element of the American Provision test requires that all parties be treated fairly and equitably.2 7 °
The "fair and equitable" language was inserted by the
Conference Committee to guarantee "that the focus for
cost cutting must not be directed exclusively at the unionized workers," but instead "the burden of sacrifices in the
reorganization process will be spread among all affected
parties." ' 27' Bankruptcy courts have interpreted this fairness element to require good faith negotiation 272 or substantial concessions by management and creditors as well
as employees, although not necessarily on a dollar-for265

11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added).

2-6

130

Id.

CONG. REC.

20,092 (1984).

Therefore, the debtor will not be able to exploit the bankruptcy procedure to rid itself of unwanted features of the labor agreement....
The word "necessary" inserted twice into this provision clearly emphasizes this required aspect of the proposal which the debtor must
offer and guarantees the sincerity of the debtor's good faith in seeking contact changes.

See 11 U.S.C. § 1113(e).
44 Bankr. 744, 745 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984).
269 Id. at 745.
270 In reAmerianc Provision Co., 44 Bankr. at 909; 11 U.S.C. § lll3(b)(1)(A).
271 130 CONG. REC. 20,092 (1984). The committee found this consideration desirable because "experience shows that when workers know that they alone are
not bearing the sole brunt of the sacrifices, they will agree to shoulder their fair
share and in some instances without the necessity for a formal contract rejection."
(statement of Sen. Packwood), Id.
272 In re K & B Mounting, 50 Bankr. at 465; see also In re William P. Brogna & Co.,
64 Bankr. 390, 393 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986); In re Valley Kitchens, 52 Bankr. at 493;
In re Cook United, Inc., 50 Bankr. 561 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985).
267

268
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dollar basis. 2 " Another fairness consideration, though
not essential, is the presence in the proposal of a "snapback" provision allowing for reinstatement of original
if and when the employer
contract terms and conditions
2 74
again.
solvent
becomes
Some courts have recognized that the rationale underlying Section 1113 is that "the road to resolution of the
conflict between labor and bankruptcy principles lies in
honest compromise. 2 75 Certainly this is in keeping with
the duty imposed upon labor and management by the
RLA to "settle all disputes... in order to avoid any interruption to commerce or the operation of any carrier.... -276 The RLA, with its emphasis on settlement of
labor-management disputes through collective bargaining, would appear to provide the ideal mechanism for
compliance with Section 1113. In practice, however, Section 1113's provision for a fair proposal and good faith
negotiation probably does not contemplate the extensive
bargaining which ordinarily precedes modification of an
airline labor contract under the RLA. In this respect, Section 1113 could benefit an airline employer which convinces the bankruptcy court that its financial plight is
genuine.
E.

Analysis

A dichotomy is again emerging as to which standard
courts should apply in approving rejection of a collective
bargaining agreement. The present state of affairs is reminiscent of the pre-Bildisco controversy between the "equity balancing" of Kevin Steel and the "onerous and
burdensome" standard of REA Express. Clearly it is the
standard of Wheeling-Pittsburgh and Wright Air Lines which
most accurately reflects the spirit of Section 1113. "[T]he
In re Waiway Co., 69 Bankr. 967, 974 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987).
In re William P. Brogna & Co., 64 Bankr. at 392; see also Wheeling-PittsburghSteel,
791 F.2d at 1090 ("snap-back" clause also a factor in "necessity" analysis).
275 In re Century Brass, 795 F.2d at 276.
276 45 U.S.C. § 152, First (1988).
273
274
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Debtor-In-Possession must establish either that the relief
sought is essential to the continuation of its business, or, that
irreparable damage to the Debtor-In-Possession
will re2 77
granted."
not
is
relief
sult if the
The Wheeling-Pittsburgh decision is based upon the legislative history of Section 1113. It provides a clear and definite standard for reconciling principles of labor and
bankruptcy law. The Carey Transportation decision, on the
other hand, affords no definite standard for accomplishing the purpose of Section 1113. It serves only the interest of the Bankruptcy Code in providing relief for debtors.
Only by holding employers to a strict standard of necessity for rejection will the statute protect collective bargaining agreements from casual rejection by an employer
who finds it economically unfeasible to perform its obligations. Eventually the Supreme Court may again have occasion to address these differences. If the Court does
again address the appropriate standards for rejection of a
collective bargaining agreement in bankruptcy, it will do
so with the guidance of a clear legislative mandate.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Despite recent developments in the law, the survival of
a collective bargaining agreement when a carrier undergoes a major economic upheaval is speculative at best.
The economic impact of the Flight Attendants decision depends upon the result of arbitration. The union could ultimately receive a significant damage award, although the
measure of damages in such a case is unclear. On the
other hand, the carrier may prevail in its contention that
the successorship clause was not intended to govern a
merger. Any award would ultimately be subject to enforcement by a federal court.
The employer's position, as stated in Flight Attendants, is
that "if a carrier were liable in damages for breach of the
successorship clause in its [collective bargaining agree277

In re Wright Air Lines, 44 Bankr. 744, 745 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984).
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ment], it might forego entering into an otherwise desirable merger. ' 278 Imposition of substantial liability upon a
carrier/employer could undeniably have that effect. The
more positive result, however, is that it would encourage
carriers to invite union participation in merger negotiations. A merger does, after all, vitally affect the union's
contractual right to represent the carrier's employees.
Significantly the Flight Attendants decision would place
this "minor dispute" back in the hands of the arbitrator
where it belongs. The possibility of a substantial damage
award could encourage merging carriers to bind successors to their labor commitments in compliance with a successorship clause. In short, a substantial damage award in
Flight Attendants could encourage carriers entering into future mergers to be more circumspect regarding their contractual obligations.
The picture for unions in the bankruptcy context has
improved, in general, only to the extent that wages and
benefits cannot be abolished arbitrarily and instantaneously upon the filing of a petition. Courts have fairly consistently held an employer to the procedural strictures of
Section 1113 and have in some instances required concessions by the employer to overcome financial exigencies.
In the end, however, the equities of the situation usually
tip in favor of the burdened employer.
The statute is sufficient to prevent recurrence of glaring
past abuses of the bankruptcy law. Negotiation procedures embodied in Section 1113 optimally will allow
union input when an employer's unsound financial condition threatens the livelihood of the union's members.
The language of Section 1113 contemplates modifications
in a collective bargaining agreement which are strictly necessary to an employer's reorganization. Only the courts'
adherence to that rigid standard for rejection of a collective bargaining agreement will encourage labor and man2178 Association of Flight Attendants v. Delta Air Lines, 879 F.2d 906, 917 (D.C.
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1781 (1990). For a discussion of the case, see
supra notes 126-186 and accompanying text.
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agement to weather economic difficulties in a mutually
beneficial manner.

